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Abstract
Normal people have a strikingly low ability to detect changes in a visual scene. This has been taken as evidence that the brain
represents only a few objects at a time, namely those currently in the focus of attention. In the present study, subjects were asked to
detect changes in the orientation of rectangular ﬁgures in a textured display across a 1600 ms gray interval. In the ﬁrst experiment,
change detection improved when the location of a possible change was cued during the interval. The cue remained eﬀective during
the entire interval, but after the interval, it was ineﬀective, suggesting that an initially large representation was overwritten by the
post-change display. To control for an eﬀect of light intensity during the interval on the decay of the representation, we compared
performance with a gray or a white interval screen in a second experiment. We found no diﬀerence between these conditions. In the
third experiment, attention was occasionally misdirected during the interval by ﬁrst cueing the wrong ﬁgure, before cueing the
correct ﬁgure. This did not compromise performance compared to a single cue, indicating that when an item is attentionally selected,
the representation of yet unchosen items remains available. In the fourth experiment, the cue was shown to be eﬀective when changes
in ﬁgure size and orientation were randomly mixed. At the time the cue appeared, subjects could not know whether size or ori-
entation would change, therefore these results suggest that the representation contains features in their bound state. Together, these
ﬁndings indicate that change blindness involves overwriting of a large capacity representation by the post-change display.
 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Although daily visual experience is rich in detail, our
memory of what we have just seen appears pretty bad at
times. The last couple of years, some striking demon-
strations of a phenomenon called change blindness
have produced a growing interest in this issue. What was
shown is that normal human subjects do not notice large
changes in the visual world when these changes occur
across brief disruptions like eye movements, blank in-
tervals, blinks etc. (Grimes, 1996; ORegan, Rensink, &
Clark, 1999; Pashler, 1988; Phillips, 1974; reviews:
Rensink, 2000a; Simons & Levin, 1997). Under normal
conditions, changes are detected due to the transient
produced by the change, which captures attention.
Change blindness occurs when the change-transient is
swamped by other transients, so that the change-tran-
sient is no longer the sole attention grabbing event
(ORegan et al., 1999). In this condition, change detec-
tion critically depends on the internal representation of
the pre-change scene and the comparison with the post-
change scene. The explanation of this phenomenon
touches one of the main questions in psychology and
neuroscience, namely How is the external world repre-
sented in the brain?
While the early visual system is activated by elements
throughout the visual ﬁeld, change blindness has been
taken as evidence for the fact that we consciously per-
ceive only a subset of this information (ORegan & Noe,
in press). This is largely determined by attention. For
example, in natural scenes, changes are more likely to be
*Corresponding author. Address: Department of Visual System
Analysis, Graduate School of Neurosciences, Amsterdam, P.O. Box
12011, 1100AA Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
E-mail address: r.landman@ioi.knaw.nl (R. Landman).
0042-6989/02/$ - see front matter  2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
PII: S0042-6989 (02 )00402-9
Vision Research 43 (2003) 149–164
www.elsevier.com/locate/visres
detected when they involve aspects of the scene that the
observer thinks are important and meaningful, than
when they involve aspects of marginal interest (ORegan
et al., 1999). When an exogenous cue draws attention to
the target item in advance, change blindness does not
occur (Scholl, 2000). People can monitor between one
and four items for change (Luck & Vogel, 1997; Pashler,
1988; Rensink, 2000a), which is similar to estimates of
attentional capacity (Pylyshyn & Storm, 1988; Rensink,
2000a; Scholl, 2001) and working memory capacity
(Cowan, 2001). Change blindness thus suggests that the
representation of unattended visual information is not
retained across views. When an image disappears, the
pre-attentive representation of the image (iconic mem-
ory, Sperling, 1960) decays within a few hundred milli-
seconds. Only using focused attention, a few items can
be transferred to working memory for later use.
Attention is thought to be required to bind features
into objects (Treisman & Gelade, 1980), and to encode a
coherent representation of those objects for retention
across disruptions (Rensink, 2000a). A pre-attentive
representation with features in the unbound state may
exist, but this representation is highly volatile and will
easily be overwritten by new information (Rensink,
2000a). Iconic memory is a pre-attentive representation.
In the typical iconic memory experiment, an array of
letters is brieﬂy shown, and one row of letters is cued
within about 800 ms after stimulus oﬀset. While subjects
can only report a few letters without the cue (whole
report), they can report many of the cued letters, even
though they have disappeared at the time of the cue
(partial report). The cue allows subjects to shift atten-
tion to the cued items and transfer them from the vol-
atile iconic memory to the more durable working
memory (Coltheart, 1980; Gegenfurtner & Sperling,
1993; Sperling, 1960). Iconic memory has a large ca-
pacity but decays rapidly (<800 ms) and is maskable.
Therefore it is highly volatile.
In the present study, we examined more closely the
transition from iconic to working memory during a
simpliﬁed one-shot change blindness paradigm. The fate
of these internal representations across shifts of atten-
tion and visual disruptions is still not quite clear. Several
hypotheses have been developed regarding the role of
internal representations in change blindness (for review,
see Simons, 2000), three of which we will brieﬂy discuss.
First, it has been proposed that whenever change
blindness occurs, representations of both pre- and post-
change information must have been poor (Levin,
Simons, Angelone, & Chabris, in press; ORegan & Noe,
in press). Recent studies have found support for this
idea. In a real-world change detection task, in which the
experimenter was surreptitiously replaced by another
person (Levin et al., in press), subjects who detected the
change correctly recognized both the pre- and post-
change experimenters from a line-up, while subjects who
missed the change were at chance at both. However, if
all instances of change blindness are due to poor pre-
and post-representations, then even the most basic fea-
tures are sometimes not represented suﬃciently, since
change blindness has been found even for features such
as orientation and luminance (Rensink, 2000b). In the
present study, we monitor the fate of orientation and
size information in the one-shot change detection par-
adigm.
A second possibility is that there may be a pre-change
representation, but it is overwritten by the post-change
representation (Beck & Levin, 2000; Becker, Pashler, &
Anstis, 2000; Brawn, Snowden, & Wolfe, 1999; Tatler,
2001). The overwriting hypothesis is supported by evi-
dence that memory for post-change objects is often
more accurate than for pre-change objects (Beck & Le-
vin, 2000; Brawn et al., 1999). Beck and Levin (2000)
showed that memory for a pre-change object was poor
even when the post-change display did not contain any
object at that location: the pre-change object simply
disappeared, and the entire display was slightly shifted
in space. However, objects in the second display could
have diverted attention away from the relevant object
(ORegan et al., 1999). Repeated search experiments
indicate that the representation of an item after atten-
tion is diverted to something else (post-attentive vision)
is indistinguishable from the pre-attentive representa-
tion (Wolfe, Klempen, & Dahlen, 2000). Brawn et al.
(1999) showed that when attention is shifted towards an
item, its immediate history is not recovered, contrary to
what object-ﬁle theory (Kahneman & Treisman, 1984)
would predict. When a target item was cued by an in-
crease in its luminance and it changed color at the same
time, subjects were at chance in naming the pre-change
color of the target. Since the array of items was con-
stantly visible, this suggests that the pre-attentive rep-
resentation is easily overwritten (Brawn et al., 1999). In
experiment 3, we tested the eﬀect of shifts of attention
during the interval of a change detection task on the pre-
change representation.
The third option is that there are pre-change as well
as post-change representations but that change blind-
ness occurs due to limited capacity in comparing the two
(Hollingworth & Henderson, 2002; Scott-Brown, Baker,
& Orbach, 2000; Shore & Klein, 2000; Simons, Chabris,
Schnur, & Levin, 2002). Angelone, Levin, and Simons
(submitted for publication) provide evidence for a com-
parison failure by showing that observers who missed a
replacement of the central actor across camera cuts in a
brief movie-clip were above chance at recognizing the
pre-change actor from a line-up. This indicates that
having a pre-change representation suﬃcient for recog-
nition does not guarantee successful change detection.
Hollingworth and Henderson (2002) show that changes
can be detected across many intervening eye movements
but that detection depends on ﬁxating the target object
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before, as well as after the change. Therefore it was
concluded that although durable representations are
present, the comparison is only made upon re-ﬁxation.
Further evidence for the role of comparison comes from
ﬁndings that spatial (Hollingworth, in press) and verbal
(Simons et al., 2002) post-change cues can enhance
change detection, in natural scenes. A post-change cue
limits the comparison to a small part of the scene, rather
than the entire scene. However, Becker et al. (2000)
failed to ﬁnd evidence for any advantage of a post-
change cue in a very simple change detection task with a
short interval and letters as stimuli. In the present study,
we cued stimulus items before, during and after the in-
terval between successive stimulus presentations. The
cue after the interval is a post-change cue, which should
enhance change detection if change blindness is due to a
limit in the ability to compare.
In the present study, we monitored the fate of ori-
entation and size information as a change detection trial
progresses by cueing at varied moments during the tri-
als. Experiment 1 shows that a considerable amount of
information remains available for up to 1500 ms after
oﬀset of a pre-change display, but not after onset of the
post-change display. Experiment 2 was done to investi-
gate whether there would be a diﬀerence between using a
gray or a white screen during the interval using a new
group of subjects. We found no diﬀerence.
In experiment 3, we examined whether this repre-
sentation would survive more than one shift of atten-
tion. Change blindness studies suggest that a diversion
of attention may be detrimental to pre-change repre-
sentations. It is commonly accepted that iconic memory
does not survive saccadic eye movements, and recent
evidence supports this (Tatler, 2001). However, saccades
are also preceded by a shift of attention (McPeek,
Maljkovic, & Nakayama, 1999). In most iconic memory
studies, a single cue triggers a shift of attention towards
a row of letters, but it is not known whether the readout
of this information involves additional shifts of atten-
tion within the row. Further, shifts of attention take
time (Duncan, Ward, & Shapiro, 1994), while the decay
of iconic memory continues. Therefore, the stability of
iconic memory across shifts of attention is not obvious.
In experiment 3, a partial report cue was occasionally
followed by a new cue, forcing subjects to select the ﬁrst
item, but then select another item (5–8 away) in re-
sponse to the new cue. The data indicate that the rep-
resentation is not compromised.
In experiment 4, we tested whether a cue-advantage
could be obtained when changes in either orientation or
size could occur. Here, a cue can only be advantageous
if the both the size and orientation of the same object are
available in the representation, because subjects cannot
predict which of these features will change. Becker et al.
(2000) found that after 85 ms, cueing can recover
enough information to support change detection, but
not for identiﬁcation of the original item. Without fo-
cused attention directed at the relevant item, it is
thought that the representation rapidly dissolves to a
level at which the features of diﬀerent objects are easily
confused (Rensink, 2000a). By the time attention ar-
rives, it may be possible to ﬁnd a single feature, but not
two features bound within the same object. The out-
come of our experiment, however, indicates that it is
possible to retrieve either of the two.
2. General methods
2.1. Materials
The stimuli were presented on a 19 in. monitor us-
ing a PC, with a refresh rate of 60 Hz. Observers sat at a
distance of about 39 in. such that the stimulus screen
subtended about 16 by 21 of visual angle. Custom
written software with MGL graphics libraries displayed
the stimuli on the screen and recorded the type of trial,
which button the subject pressed, whether the response
was correct etc.
The stimulus displays consisted of textured ﬁelds in
which eight rectangular ﬁgures were deﬁned, either by
line orientation (experiments 1–3) or dot color (experi-
ment 4). The rectangles were placed on an imaginary
circle with a radius of about 4 from the center of the
screen, with a random jitter for each individual rectangle
of between 0 and 1 towards the center or periphery.
The orientation of each rectangle was either horizontal
or vertical. The orientations were randomly assigned,
with the precondition that each orientation should be
used at least once in each display, to prevent displays in
which all items had the same orientation. Throughout
the trial, there was a red ﬁxation point (0.18 in size) in
the center of the screen. In the interval between suc-
cessive stimulus presentations, the screen was gray in all
experiments except in experiment 2, where one version
of the task had a white screen during the interval. Av-
erage light intensity of the line orientation screens was
165 lx. There was no luminance diﬀerence between the
ﬁgures and the background. Average light intensity of
the dot colored screens was 140 lx, although in these
displays there were small diﬀerences in luminance
among ﬁgures and between ﬁgures and background due
to diﬀerences in color. Light intensity of the gray screen
was 75 lx, and the white screen was 255 lx.
A cue was presented to indicate which rectangle was
likely to change. The cue was a yellow (experiments 1–3)
or red (experiment 4) line, superimposed on the current
image in the trial, placed in such a manner that one end
was close to the ﬁxation point (distance  0:7) and the
other end was close to the target rectangle (distance 
0:7). The length of the cue varied with the distance of the
target rectangle, with an average of 2 of visual angle.
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2.2. Procedure
Each trial a display with rectangular ﬁgures was
presented for 500 ms (stimulus 1), followed by an in-
terval, after which the display with the rectangles re-
appeared (stimulus 2).
In 50% of all trials, in stimulus 2 one randomly
chosen rectangle had changed orientation (experiments
1–3) or size (experiment 4). Stimulus 2 remained on
screen until the subject pressed a mouse button to re-
spond. As a button was pressed, subjects heard a high
tone if the response was correct, and a low tone if the
response was incorrect. Then the screen was green for
about 1 s, before a new display of rectangles was shown.
Interval durations were 400, 1000 and 1600 ms in the
pilot experiment, 1600 ms in experiments 1–3, and 1500
ms in experiment 4.
Prior to the ﬁrst session, the experimenter explained
the task. In experiments 1–3, the subjects were instructed
to detect whether any of the rectangles changed its ori-
entation across the two presentations (horizontal to
vertical or vertical to horizontal). Experiment 4 con-
sisted of three diﬀerent tasks with instructions to either
detect changes in orientation, size, or both, depending
on the task. They were told that 50% of all trials con-
tained a change, and one rectangle would change at a
time. Subjects responded by pressing a mouse button:
right button if they thought there was a change, left
button if they thought there was no change. They were
informed that a cue would appear in most of the trials
and that the cue meant If there is a change in this trial,
it is the rectangle where the cue points at. If that rect-
angle does not change, there is no change in this trial.
The subjects were allowed 15 trials of practice, before
beginning the ﬁrst session.
2.3. Analysis
We used a method described by Pashler (1988) to
express performance in terms of the number of items
subjects have available for comparison, which we call
capacity:
hit rate
¼ capacity=number of figures
þððnumber of figures-capacityÞ=number of figuresÞg
where g equals the false alarm rate. Thus,
capacity ¼ ðhit rate  number of figures
 number of figures  false alarm rateÞ=ð1
 false alarm rateÞ
This formula assumes that people hold on to a partic-
ular number of items (capacity), and answer yes when
one of them changes, while when there is no change
among those items, they answer no or guess yes in a
certain proportion of trials (g), which is given by the
false alarm rate. Like Pashler (1988) also admitted, this
model may be crude in admitting no storage of partial
information and attributing performance entirely to the
maintenance, rather than the comparison process.
However, it seems to provide a reasonable description of
performance and corrects for guessing. This method has
also been used by others (Luck & Vogel, 1997). We
additionally analyzed the fraction of correct responses,
sensitivity d 0 (Green & Swets, 1966), in experiment 1.
Paired t-tests were done to determine signiﬁcant dif-
ferences where necessary. All paired t-tests were 2-tailed,
with a ¼ 0:05.
3. Experiment 1
A previous study has shown that an attentional cue
can increase performance in a change detection/change
blindness task (Becker et al., 2000). A cue was eﬀective
not only when given while the original stimulus was still
present, but also 215 ms after the oﬀset of original
stimulus, namely in the interval between the original
stimulus and the changed stimulus. In the present ex-
periment, longer intervals were used, and the moment at
which the cue appeared was varied.
Using the method described by Pashler (1988), we
were able to estimate how many items subjects have
available for comparison at diﬀerent moments of cue
presentation (capacity). This way we could get a better
idea of what happens to the representation of objects
from the moment the original stimulus disappears,
throughout the interval and after the stimulus re-ap-
pears. In the condition where the cue appears while the
original stimulus is still visible, it is not really justiﬁed to
speak about memory capacity, because a capacity of 1
would be suﬃcient in that case. However, the crucial
conditions in this experiment are those in which the cue
appears during the interval, and in that case memory
capacity does play a role. Capacity is used as a single
measure for all conditions to be able to compare them.
In what we will refer to as the pilot, two observers
were tested in three versions of the task which diﬀered in
the length of the interval (400, 1000 and 1600 ms). In the
actual experiment, the 1600 ms version was tested in
seven observers.
3.1. Methods
Participants: In the pilot, two experienced observers
(VL and RL) were tested at three diﬀerent interval du-
rations. In the experiment, seven observers (three expe-
rienced, including one of the authors, four na€ıve) with
normal or corrected to normal visual acuity took part.
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Materials: The stimulus displays consisted of black
diagonal line segments on a white background, where
most of the screen was ﬁlled with line segments of one
orientation, except at the location of ﬁgures (rectangles),
where the lines had the orthogonal orientation. The
rectangles did not have an outline, but the texture dis-
continuity made them pop-out from the rest of the
texture (Bergen & Julesz, 1983), thus yielding the per-
cept of rectangular ﬁgures on a background. The length
of the line segments was about 0.5 of visual angle. All
rectangles subtended 0.9 by 1.8 of visual angle. Fig. 1A
shows an example of a stimulus display.
Procedure: In the pilot, there were three versions of
the task, deﬁned by the length of the interval.
In version 1, the interval was 400 ms. There were ﬁve
conditions, deﬁned by the timing of the cue, measured
Fig. 1. (A) Example of a stimulus display used in experiments 1, 2 and 3; (B) schematic picture of the stimulus sequence in the pilot experiment
(version 1, 2 and 3), and experiments 1 and 2 (version 3 was used in experiments 1 and 2). The moment at which the stimuli and cues are presented is
indicated by their position on the long horizontal bar. The arrow shows an example of a cue appearing during the interval. On another trial, a cue
could appear in stimulus 1 or stimulus 2. The black cue labels on the time bars indicate the moments at which a cue could appear (duration: 100 ms).
In the experiments, the cue was a yellow line. Each trial, one cue appeared at one time only, or there was no cue (no cue-condition). The cue was
superimposed on what was on the screen at that moment. The three versions of the task diﬀer in the length of the interval (400, 1000, and 1600 ms).
Stimulus 1 was shown for 500 ms, then there was the interval, and ﬁnally stimulus 2 was shown. Stimulus 2 remained on screen until the observer
responded. In the pilot and in experiment 1, the screen was gray during the interval. In experiment 2, one session contained a gray interval and the
other session contained a white interval.
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from the start of the interval: )300; 0; 300; 600 ms, plus
a condition with no cue. Thus, the cue at 600 ms ap-
peared after the onset of stimulus 2 (the reappearance of
the rectangles).
In version 2, the interval was 1000 ms. There were
seven conditions, with a cue at: )300; 0; 300; 600; 900;
1200 ms, plus a condition with no cue. The cue at 1200
ms appeared after the onset of stimulus 2.
In version 3, the interval was 1600 ms. There were
nine conditions, with a cue at: )300; 0; 300; 600; 900;
1200; 1500; 1800 ms, plus a condition with no cue. The
cue at 1800 ms appeared after the onset of stimulus 2.
The main experiment was done with version 3 of the
task. Subjects ran three sessions of 144 trials each. The
number of change-/no-change trials per location and
condition were balanced, but randomly mixed within
each session. Each condition contained 48 trials. A
schematic picture of the conditions is shown in Fig. 1B.
3.2. Results
Pilot: The bar charts in Fig. 2 show the performance
of the two observers in the pilot. The data from the three
versions of the task have several aspects in common, in
both observers: First, when no cue was given (white
bars), the outcome of our capacity measure was 4.5 or
less. Second, when the cue was given before the interval
(left black bar in each chart), capacity was almost 8,
indicating that the cue eﬀectively improved change de-
tection to almost perfect performance.
When the cue appeared during the interval (gray
bars), capacity was higher than when no cue was given
Fig. 2. Results of the pilot experiment. The outcome of the capacity measure is shown for each condition in the three versions (400, 1000 and 1600 ms
interval) for both observers, VL (upper charts) and RL (lower charts). The labels on the X -axis indicate each condition by the time the cue appeared,
measured from the oﬀset of stimulus 1, as well as the no cue-condition.
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(white bars), although capacity did decrease during the
interval in each version. Perhaps the most important
observation is that capacity appeared to decrease as a
function of time to stimulus 2 onset, rather than on time
from stimulus 1 oﬀset. For example, at the shortest in-
terval (version 1), capacity with the cue at 300 ms was
only slightly higher than in the no cue-condition. With
a longer interval (version 2), capacity at 300 ms was
much higher in both observers. In version 2, capacity in
observer VL has decreased by the time the cue appears
at 900 ms, but with a longer interval (version 3), there
was hardly any decrease at 900 ms. In both observers,
capacity ﬁrmly decreased when the cue appeared just
before the onset of stimulus 2 in all three versions of the
task. Mixed results were found when the cue was given
after the interval (right black bar in each chart). Here,
capacity was not always higher then when no cue was
given.
Experiment: Task version 3 was tested in seven sub-
jects. The leftmost chart in Fig. 3A presents subjects
average capacity in each of the nine conditions. The
results were similar to those observed in the pilot. When
no cue was given (white bar), capacity was about 4.
When the cue was given before the interval (left black
bar), capacity was almost 8, indicating that the cue ef-
fectively improves change detection to almost perfect
performance. When the cue appeared during the inter-
val, it remained eﬀective. Despite some decrease during
the ﬁrst 600 ms, capacity remained above 6. However,
when the cue appeared after the onset of stimulus 2
(at 1800 ms), capacity was again about four items. A
paired t-test indicated no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between
Fig. 3. (A) Results of experiment 1 (n ¼ 7). Leftmost chart indicates the outcome of the capacity measure for each condition. The labels on the X -axis
indicate each condition by the time the cue appeared, measured from the oﬀset of stimulus 1, as well as the no cue-condition. The curve and asterisk
indicate a signiﬁcant diﬀerence (p < 0:02); middle chart shows the results of experiment 1 expressed as the fraction of correct responses for each
condition; Rightmost chart shows the results of experiment 1 expressed as the sensitivity, d 0 (Green & Swets, 1966). The curve and asterisk indicate a
signiﬁcant diﬀerence (p < 0:005). (B) Capacity of na€ıve observers (n ¼ 4) in ﬁrst and third session of experiment 1. Leftmost chart is the ﬁrst session,
middle chart is the third session, and the rightmost chart shows the values of the third minus the ﬁrst session. The labels on the X -axis indicate each
condition by the time the cue appeared, measured from the oﬀset of stimulus 1, as well as the no cue-condition. The diﬀerence shows that per-
formance improved with experience. For a schematic representation of the stimulus sequence and conditions in this experiment, see Fig. 1 (version 3).
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cue-after-stimulus-2 and the no cue-condition (tð12Þ ¼
0:004, p ¼ 0:99). When the cue appeared 1500 ms after
oﬀset of stimulus 1, capacity was still signiﬁcantly higher
than when the cue appeared after the onset of stimulus 2
(tð12Þ ¼ 3:02, p < 0:02). The same tendency can be ob-
served in the fraction correct responses (middle chart
Fig. 3A), and the sensitivity, d 0 (rightmost chart Fig.
3A). Although d 0 was considerably lower when the cue
appeared in the interval than when it appeared before
the interval, d 0 was still signiﬁcantly higher with a cue at
1200 ms than with a cue after the onset of stimulus 2
(tð12Þ ¼ 3:44, p < 0:005). The criterion value b (Green &
Swets, 1966) was positive for all conditions, with a peak
level of 0.97 for the condition with the cue at 1500 ms,
except when the cue appeared before the interval ()0.2),
indicating a bias favoring no-change responses in most
conditions. Some learning took place over the course of
the three sessions, as indicated by the data of the inex-
perienced observers ﬁrst and third session (see Fig. 3B).
The increase in performance is especially pronounced
for late cues, with the strongest increase at 1200 ms
within the interval (approximately two extra items in
terms of capacity).
3.3. Discussion
The results from the pilot experiment indicate that
cueing can improve change detection even when the cue
appears during the interval between successive images,
as predicted by ﬁndings of Becker et al. (2000). Al-
though the estimated number of retained items decreases
during the interval, this decrease appears related to time
from stimulus 2 onset rather than to time from stimulus
1 oﬀset. This suggests that the decrease in the number of
items in the representation of items is due to interfer-
ence, rather than decay.
The results of this experiment indicate that people
have a large capacity representation of a stimulus (more
than four items) for at least 1500 ms after it has disap-
peared. This representation can be used to detect a
change when the stimulus reappears, when cued before
the onset of stimulus 2. When no cue appears, only four
items remain available to detect a change, which is in
accordance with previous estimates (Luck & Vogel,
1997). The cue-advantage may result from a fragile, but
large capacity memory store co-existing with working
working memory, perhaps similar to iconic memory. In
response to the cue, subjects may transfer the target item
from iconic memory to the more durable working
memory, so as to protect it against interference from
stimulus 2 (Becker et al., 2000; Gegenfurtner & Sperling,
1993). Like Becker et al. (2000), we found that post-
change cueing was useless, indicating that limiting the
comparison to only one object after the change does not
improve change detection. This argues against the
hypothesis that change blindness is due to failed com-
parisons (Hollingworth, in press; Hollingworth & Hen-
derson, 2002; Scott-Brown et al., 2000; Shore & Klein,
2000; Simons, 2000; Simons et al., 2002). However, most
of the evidence for post-change cue-advantage involve
natural(istic) scenes, whereas our study and that of
Becker et al. (2000) used abstract ﬁgures and letters not
embedded in a natural environment. Natural scenes and
natural objects may allow subjects to make a high level
representation, abstracted from metric visual detail.
This type of representation may be more stable (Hol-
lingworth, in press). A more parsimonious explanation,
however, is that the representation of our artiﬁcial
stimuli strictly involves sensory memory, which is ap-
parently more easily erased, as also suggested by iconic
memory studies (Sperling, 1960).
A remarkable aspect of our ﬁndings is that the cue
remains advantageous for such a long time: 1500 ms,
considerably longer than the estimated duration of ico-
nic memory (Sperling, 1960). It cannot be argued that
this is due to lower light intensity in the interval (75 lx)
than the stimuli (165 lx). A strong luminance contrast
between ﬁgures and background, (such as black letters on
a white background) would have produced a long last-
ing after-image of the ﬁgures when followed by a dark
interval (Averbach & Sperling, 1961; DiLollo & Bischof,
1995). In our stimuli, there was no luminance diﬀerence
between the ﬁgures and the background, therefore the
duration of the after-image left behind by the ﬁgures was
negligible. Nevertheless, in experiment 2 we rule out a
contribution of light intensity by a direct comparison
between a white and a gray interval screen in a new
group of subjects.
Practice with the task apparently increases perfor-
mance and increases subjects ability to take advantage
of the cue, which is in accordance with suggestions from
another study with partial report (Chow, 1985). Inex-
perienced subjects may not shift attention to the cued
item fast enough to protect the item against interference
by stimulus 2. However, even in naive subjects doing the
task for the ﬁrst time, capacity at 1200 ms into the in-
terval is two points higher than the no cue-condition. In
contrast, in most iconic memory experiments, partial
report performance decays to whole report level within
500 ms (Averbach & Sperling, 1961; Sperling, 1960).
4. Experiment 2
In the previous experiment, iconic memory remained
available throughout the 1500 ms interval. However, it
could be that the light intensity of the interval plays a
role in the decay time of the memory trace. Averbach
and Sperling (1961) showed that the duration of iconic
memory increases as the luminance of the post-stimulus
screen decreases. In the previous experiment, we used a
gray interval screen. A white screen (stronger light
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intensity) may yield a stronger decay. In the next ex-
periment, a new group of observers did two versions of
the task, to check whether a strong light intensity during
the interval yields a lower capacity compared to a low
light intensity during the interval. Seven observers, who
did not join the previous experiment, did one session of
the task with a gray interval, and one session with a
version in which the screen during the interval was white.
4.1. Methods
Participants: Seven observers (one experienced, six
na€ıve). All observers had normal or corrected to normal
visual acuity.
Materials: There were two versions of the task,
identical to the task in the previous experiment (version
3), except that in one version, the screen during the in-
terval was white.
Procedure: The interval duration (1600 ms) and
conditions (9) were identical to the task in experiment 1
(Fig. 1B, version 3). Subjects ran one session of 144
trials on each version of the task. The order in which the
task versions were tested was mixed across subjects.
Analysis: Capacity measures (experiment 1) were used
to evaluate performance. Paired t-tests for each condi-
tion were done to test for diﬀerences between capacity
when the interval was white and capacity when the in-
terval was gray. Additionally, paired t-tests within each
version of the task were done to test for diﬀerences be-
tween conditions with cue and the no cue-condition. All
paired t-tests were 2-tailed.
4.2. Results
The bar charts in Fig. 4 present subjects average
capacity for each version of the task, and the diﬀerence
between the two versions. There were no signiﬁcant
diﬀerences between the two versions for any condition
(rightmost chart). Although capacity decreased as the
cue delay increased, the diﬀerence with the no-cue con-
dition was still signiﬁcant at 1200 ms after stimulus
oﬀset in both versions of the task (paired t-test [cue 1200
ms vs no cue], gray version: tð12Þ ¼ 3:25, p ¼ 0:007;
white version: tð12Þ ¼ 2:87, p ¼ 0:014). Although the
cue still appeared to be eﬀective after stimulus 2 onset,
the diﬀerences with no cue did not reach signiﬁcance
(paired t-test [cue 1800 ms vs no cue], gray:
tð12Þ ¼ 1:31, p ¼ 0:21; white: tð12Þ ¼ 1:61, p ¼ 0:13).
4.3. Discussion
The purpose of experiment 2 was to test whether
capacity with a cue during the interval would be lower
when the interval screen is white, compared to when the
interval screen is gray, as in the ﬁrst experiment. We
found no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the two versions
of the task, indicating that the luminance of the interval
screen cannot account for the eﬀect we reported in ex-
periment 1.
Overall performance in this experiment was lower
than in experiment 1. However, the present experiment
only consisted of a single session per task version, while
in experiment 1, subjects ran three sessions. Further, in
Fig. 4. Results of experiment 2 (new group of observers, n ¼ 7). Average capacity for each version of the task (left, gray interval; middle, white
interval; right, gray minus white). There were no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the two versions for any condition (rightmost chart). The curve and
asterisk indicate signiﬁcant diﬀerences (gray: p ¼ 0:007; white: p ¼ 0:014). Conditions were identical to experiment 1, except that the luminance of the
interval screen was diﬀerent in the task with the white interval. For a schematic representation of the stimulus sequence and conditions, see Fig. 1
(version 3).
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the present experiment, six out of seven subjects were
naive, while in experiment 1, ﬁve out of seven subjects
were na€ıve.
Compared to typical iconic memory studies, decay in
our experiments is slow. This can perhaps be explained
by a diﬀerence in paradigms. In our experiments, sub-
jects only have to press a button to indicate whether the
stimulus is same or diﬀerent, whereas in the typical
iconic memory experiment, subjects have to verbally
identify items, which takes time and could in itself in-
terfere with recall (Coltheart, 1980; Sperling, 1960).
Further, Becker et al. (2000) showed that a cue supports
change detection up to a later stage in the interval than
identiﬁcation of the pre-change item, indicating that
more information is required for identiﬁcation than for
change detection. Further, in iconic memory studies,
stimuli are usually letters (Coltheart, 1980; Sperling,
1960), whereas we used rectangular ﬁgures and subjects
had to detect changes in just one basic feature: orien-
tation.
5. Experiment 3
Experiment 1 showed that after an image disappears,
there is a representation of the orientation of almost all
items in a display. This representation can be accessed
and used for change detection when attention is cued to
the appropriate item. But what happens to the other
items in memory after such a shift of attention is exe-
cuted? It has been proposed that spatially and tempo-
rally coherent representations only exist within the
current focus of attention. Thus, once the focus of at-
tention has shifted to one of the items, the representa-
tion of other items may dissolve (Rensink, 2000a;
Wolfe, 1999). Most change blindness studies use ma-
nipulations such as strong luminance transients to divert
attention. This may be detrimental to pre-change rep-
resentations. Moreover, in studies using successive
stimulus presentations, the stimuli themselves may in-
clude components that attract attention and thereby
compromise the pre-change representation. Saccades are
known to wipe out iconic memory, however, the role of
attentional shifts in this respect is not known, since
iconic memory experiments usually include only one cue
for items which are grouped in a matrix.
In the present experiment, a cue was always presented
during the interval. However, some trials contained two
cues (condition 3). Subjects were told that whenever
they saw a second cue, that second cue was the real cue.
Because the conditions were randomly mixed, one could
not predict whether a given trial would contain one or
two cues. We controlled for the possibility that subjects
postponed their shift of attention to wait for a possible
second cue, by including condition 2, in which stimulus
2 appeared earlier. Postponing an attentional shift
would then lead to low performance in that condition,
because the item would not be selected in time before the
appearance of stimulus 2.
5.1. Methods
Participants: In this experiment, the same subjects
took part as in experiment 1, at the same day. Sessions
of each experiment were intermingled. The same mate-
rials were used.
Procedure: The procedure was roughly the same as in
experiment 1, except that now there were four condi-
tions. The time from the start of the interval (or the
oﬀset of stimulus 1) for the presentation of the cues and
the changed stimulus were varied, in addition to the
presence of a fake cue. Condition 1: cue at 400 ms,
changed image at 1000 ms; condition 2: cue at 400 ms,
changed image at 1600 ms; condition 3: fake cue at 400
ms, real cue at 1000 ms, changed image at 1600 ms;
condition 4: Cue at 1000 ms, changed image at 1600 ms.
A schematic picture of the conditions can be seen in Fig.
5A.
In condition 3, (with the fake cue), the fake cue
looked exactly like a real cue. With real cue we mean
that it was the only useful cue in the same sense as in
experiment 1 and in the other conditions. The fake cue
pointed at an item that would not change. On the
imaginary circle of items, there was always at least one
item between the item cued by the real cue and the one
cued by the fake cue. Subjects were given the same basic
instruction, with the addition that whenever they saw a
second cue, that cue would be the real cue. Each subject
ran three sessions of 68 trials each. The number of
change-/no-change trials per location and condition
were balanced, but these diﬀerent types of trial were
presented in a random fashion. Each condition con-
tained 48 trials per subject.
Analysis: Capacity measures (experiment 1) were used
to evaluate performance. Paired t-tests were done to
determine whether performance is worse when the real
cue is preceded by a fake cue (condition 3) than when
only the real cue is presented at the same moment in
time (condition 4). If uncued items are lost, condition 3
should be worse. Condition 2, in which stimulus 2 ap-
peared early to control for postponement of the atten-
tional shift, was compared to condition 1, where
stimulus 2 appeared later.
5.2. Results
The bar chart in Fig. 5B presents subjects average
capacity in each of the four conditions. Condition 3
(with the fake cue) and condition 4 are not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent, indicating that the fake cue did not make the
real cue less eﬀective (tð12Þ ¼ 0:26, p ¼ 0:8). Capacity in
condition 2 is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from condition 1
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(tð12Þ ¼ 0:12, p ¼ 0:9). It is also not lower than com-
parable conditions in experiment 1 (conditions 3 and 4),
indicating that subjects did not postpone a shift of at-
tention awaiting a possible second cue ([cond 2, expt 3]
vs [cond 3, expt 1] tð12Þ ¼ 0:12, p ¼ 0:9; [cond 2, expt 3]
vs [cond 4, expt 1] tð12Þ ¼ 0:39, p ¼ 0:69). Capacity in
conditions 1 and 2 is slightly higher than conditions 3
and 4 (not signiﬁcant: cond 1 vs cond 3 tð12Þ ¼ 1:40,
p ¼ 0:18; cond 1 vs cond 4 tð12Þ ¼ 1:70, p ¼ 0:11; cond 2
vs cond 3 tð12Þ ¼ 1:22, p ¼ 0:24; cond 2 vs cond 4
tð12Þ ¼ 1:44, p ¼ 0:17). This is possibly because the
(real) cue appears earlier in conditions 1 and 2. Criterion
value b was positive for all conditions (minimum: 0.08
condition 1; maximum 0.60 condition 2), indicating a
bias favoring no-change responses.
5.3. Discussion
The results of this experiment indicate that cueing
subjects to shift attention to an item in memory does not
render other items unavailable. Therefore, this memory
does not require focal attention to be maintained. Ap-
parently, one can freely pick items from the existing
representation and save them into a more durable store
without losing yet unchosen items.
It has been proposed that the representations only
remain coherent within the focus of attention, which
implies that the representation of unattended informa-
tion should become worse very rapidly (Rensink,
2000a). Iconic memory studies would also predict a
strong decrease in the number of available items
Fig. 5. (A) Schematic picture of the stimulus sequence in experiment 3. The procedure was roughly the same as in experiment 1, except that now there
were four conditions. For the sake of clarity, the stimulus sequence is represented by a separate time bar for each condition. The critical condition in
this experiment was condition 3, in which two cues were presented. Condition 3 was identical to condition 4 except that the real cue was preceded by a
fake cue pointing at another item. Except for its non-validity, the fake cue looked exactly like a normal cue; (B) results of experiment 2. The outcome
of the capacity measure for each condition. The labels on the X -axis indicate each condition. There are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences. An example of a
stimulus display used in this experiment is shown in Fig. 1A.
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between 400 ms (ﬁrst cue) and 1000 ms (second cue)
after stimulus oﬀset (Sperling, 1960). However, the two
cues in our experiment were 600 ms apart and there was
no signiﬁcant decrease in capacity during that time.
Our results do make sense in respect to other recent
ﬁndings. Using a variation on the repeated search par-
adigm, Wolfe and Brawn (submitted for publication)
show that after an item has been attended and attention
is shifted to another item, subsequent changes to the
previously attended item are not noticed. When the item
is hidden and subjects are asked to name the color of
that item, subjects mention the color it had when it was
attended. Thus, the representation of items may be
maintained across shifts of attention, but is not updated
when changes occur outside the focus of attention. In-
vestigations by Hollingworth, Williams, and Henderson
(2001) even show that changes can be detected after
observers make several intervening eye movements, and
hence shifts of attention, indicating that information
must have been maintained.
6. Experiment 4
Experiments 1 and 2 showed that there is a large
capacity representation of the orientation of items in a
display. We wanted to know whether this representation
is just a collection of single features or whether binding
has taken place. This tells us more about the level of
processing at which this representation is made. In
search tasks, searching for targets deﬁned by single
features is independent of the number of distractors,
whereas targets deﬁned by conjunctions of features take
longer to be found as more distractors are present. This
marks the diﬀerence between pre-attentive and atten-
tive processing respectively (Wolfe, 1996). Processing of
conjunctions requires binding of features that belong to
a single object. Repeated search experiments show that
search for changes in color-orientation pairings is inef-
ﬁcient, and remains ineﬃcient even after extended ex-
posure (Wolfe, Oliva, Butcher, & Arsenio, 2002). This is
in support of the idea that pre- and post-attentive vision
consists of an unbound soup of basic features (Treisman
& Gelade, 1980; Wolfe et al., 2000). Luck and Vogel
(1997) estimated the capacity of working memory using
a change detection task. They found a capacity of four
items when people were detecting changes in color, but
also when they were detecting changes in size or color.
Therefore, they concluded that the capacity of working
memory, which they think was the crucial factor in their
task, must be understood in terms of integrated objects
rather than individual features (Luck & Vogel, 1997).
In the present experiment we showed subjects rect-
angles of diﬀerent sizes and orientations. To test the
representation during the interval for conjunctions, we
randomly mixed trials in which a rectangle changed size
with trials in which a rectangle changed orientation. One
could argue that either size or orientation is not a
conjunction, but disjunction. However, in order to make
use of the cue during the interval in that condition,
people must select both size and orientation of the same
object in order to know whether one of them has
changed in stimulus 2. The type of representation we
investigate may support the retrieval of orientation in-
formation, but not orientation and size of the same
object. We mixed sessions of this conjunction task with
sessions containing only size changes or sessions con-
taining only orientation changes. The displays were
constructed from colored dots instead of line segments.
The rectangles within each display could have diﬀerent
colors, to minimize grouping based on size or orienta-
tion.
6.1. Methods
Participants: Seven observers who did not take part
in the other experiments, except one author (three ex-
perienced, four na€ıve) with normal or corrected to
normal visual acuity took part in the experiment.
Materials: The basic materials used in this experiment
were the same as in experiment 1. However, in this ex-
periment, the stimulus displays consisted of dots on a
white background. The rectangles were deﬁned by a
diﬀerence in the color of the dots with respect to the
surrounding dots, which were gray. Within each display,
each rectangles could be composed of red, yellow, blue
or green dots. In this experiment, the rectangles could
have two sizes: big (0.9 by 1.8) or small (0.6 by 1.2).
The colors and sizes were randomly assigned, with the
precondition that each color and each size should be
used at least once in each display. The cue in this ex-
periment was a red line instead of a yellow one.
Procedure: The basic procedure was identical to ex-
periment 1, except that in this experiment, the gray in-
terval lasted 1500 ms. Sessions with only orientation
changes (orientation task), only size changes (size
task) and both size and orientation changes (conjunc-
tion task) were mixed. In the orientation task, subjects
were instructed to judge whether any of the rectangles
changed its orientation across the two presentations
(horizontal to vertical or vertical to horizontal). In the
size task, they were instructed to judge whether any of
the rectangles changed in size across the two presenta-
tions. In the conjunction task, they were instructed to
judge whether any of the rectangles changed in either
size or orientation. The conjunction task contained an
equal number of size changes as the number of orien-
tation changes, and they were randomly mixed. In trials
in which there was a change, it was either a size change
or an orientation change.
Each task had three conditions based on the time at
which the cue was presented. Cue-times in ms from the
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start of the gray interval (or oﬀset of stimulus 1) were
)300, 700 or 1600. At 1600 ms, the cue came 100 ms
after the onset of stimulus 2. A schematic picture of the
conditions can be seen in Fig. 6A. For each task, sub-
jects ran three sessions of 96 trials. The number of
change-/no-change trials per location and cue-time
condition were balanced, but these diﬀerent types of trial
were randomly mixed. Because each task had three
conditions, each condition contained 96 trials per sub-
ject. In the conjunction task, each condition contained
an equal number of size and orientation changes.
6.2. Results
The bar charts in Fig. 6B show the results for the
orientation task, the size task and the conjunction task.
In each task, capacity is highest when the cue is given in
advance and worst when given after the appearance of
stimulus 2, like in experiment 1. A cue during the
interval (condition 2) yields a higher score on our ca-
pacity measure than a cue after the interval (condition 3)
in each task (paired t-tests orientation tð12Þ ¼ 2:37,
p < 0:05; size tð12Þ ¼ 2:18, p < 0:05; conjunction
tð12Þ ¼ 2:51, p < 0:05). Capacity after the interval
(rightmost bar in each graph) is not signiﬁcantly lower
in the conjunction task than in the other two tasks
(conjunction vs size tð12Þ ¼ 0:89, p ¼ 0:38; conjunction
vs orientation tð12Þ ¼ 1:99, p ¼ 0:07). Capacity during
the interval in the conjunction task is not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from the same condition in the other two tasks
(conjunction vs size tð12Þ ¼ 0:33, p ¼ 0:74; conjunction
vs orientation tð12Þ ¼ 1:72, p ¼ 0:1).
6.3. Discussion
The results of experiment 3 show that after an image
disappears, the representation that remains available
contains not only the orientation of the objects that were
Fig. 6. (A) Schematic picture of the stimulus sequence in experiment 4, which was identical for the orientation, size and conjunction task. Each task
had three conditions deﬁned by the timing of the cue. The moment at which a cue could appear is indicated by the position of the short cue labels on
the long horizontal bar. The arrow shows an example of a cue appearing during the interval. On another trial, a cue could appear in stimulus 1 or
stimulus 2 as indicated by the labels on the long horizontal bar. (B) Results for the orientation, the size, and the conjunction task of experiment 3.
The outcome of the capacity measure is shown for each condition. The labels on the X -axis indicate each condition by the time the cue appeared, as
measured from the oﬀset of stimulus 1. The bent curves indicate the comparisons that were made. Asterisks indicate signiﬁcant diﬀerences (see text
for details). NS ¼ non-significant.
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in it, but also their size. In the conjunction task, when
the cue appeared during the interval, stimulus 2 had not
yet appeared, so the subjects could not know at that
point whether a change in size or orientation would
occur. Therefore, in order to take advantage of the cue,
they must have taken both the size and orientation of
the same object and put it in a more durable store like
working memory, to make the comparison after ap-
pearance of stimulus 2. Apparently, subjects can get that
combined information from the representation for as
many items as they have available when looking for a
change in only one dimension.
7. General discussion
The present experiments were done to further char-
acterize the memory for a visual image shortly after it
has disappeared. In the ﬁrst experiment we showed that
this memory has a high capacity and it remains intact
for at least 1200 ms, and 1500 ms in experienced ob-
servers. This memory can be used to improve change
detection performance if the location where a change is
likely to occur is cued before the image reappears,
supporting ﬁndings of Becker et al. (2000). Our second
experiment shows that the luminance of the interval
screen does not inﬂuence the cue-advantage. The third
experiment showed that attention can be shifted to one
item within the representation, without reducing the
availability of other items. The fourth experiment shows
that the cue-advantage is not limited to changes in ori-
entation, but can also be found for size changes.
Moreover, when it is unpredictable whether a change
will involve orientation or size, the cue-advantage is still
found. This indicates that the representation must con-
tain information about which features belong to which
object.
These results support ﬁndings that four items or less
are available for comparison after a change has occurred
(Luck & Vogel, 1997; Pashler, 1988; Rensink, 2000a),
but that there is a representation of more pre-change
items before the stimulus re-appears. A number of items
may be overwritten or masked by the onset of the new
stimulus, in this case the reappearance of the rectangles
(Beck & Levin, 2000; Becker et al., 2000; Brawn et al.,
1999; Tatler, 2001). Although our use of the cue is very
similar to the partial report method in iconic memory
studies (Coltheart, 1980, 1983), our results indicate that
information for change detection remains available for a
longer period than the estimated decay time of iconic
memory.
One alternative to account for the large memory ca-
pacity we ﬁnd is grouping. Since the orientation (or
size, in expt 4) of the items was randomized, some dis-
plays could have many items of the same orientation.
Items of one type may be grouped to form one chunk
of information. The conﬁguration of each display was
not recorded, therefore we cannot rule this out. The
method we used to determine memory capacity assumes
independent memory for each item, but if grouping is a
factor, large capacity could mean either a lot of simple
things or a few more complicated ones. However, we did
put one constraint on randomization to prevent group-
ing, namely that no display could contain only items of
one type (e.g. all horizontal). Further, even when
memory during the interval was coded as groups of
items rather than individual items, our main eﬀect re-
mains, namely that capacity during the interval is larger
than after the interval.
Like Becker et al. (2000), we found that cueing after
change occurrence is useless. This argues against the
possibility that change blindness in this paradigm is due
to a limit in the capacity to compare (Hollingworth &
Henderson, 2002; Scott-Brown et al., 2000; Shore &
Klein, 2000; Simons et al., 2002). Cueing after reap-
pearance greatly simpliﬁes the comparison, because it
becomes unnecessary to compare the entire array: one
just has to compare one rectangle with how it looked
before. However, our results have shown that in that
condition, change detection does not improve over get-
ting no cue at all. As discussed in experiment 1, the type
of stimuli we used may play a role. Natural scenes may
allow subjects to make a high level representation, ab-
stracted from metric visual detail, which is fairly stable
(Hollingworth, in press), whereas for our artiﬁcial and
meaningless stimuli, subjects are not inclined to make
such high level abstractions.
The present data agree with the presence of two
parallel types of short term memory (Baddeley, 1986;
Coltheart, 1983; Phillips, 1974). Almost all items enter
the ﬁrst type of memory. It is like iconic memory, be-
cause it has a high capacity and it is maskable (Colt-
heart, 1983; Sperling, 1960). The second type of memory
is one that resists interference by new stimuli. When new
items enter the visual system, they replace the old items,
except the ones that have entered the second type of
representation. A maximum of about four items can
simultaneously be in that state. This is usually called
working memory (Baddeley, 1986; Luck & Vogel, 1997),
or short term memory (Phillips, 1974). The cue-advan-
tage arises because the subjects selectively transfer the
cued item from iconic memory to the more durable
working memory (Coltheart, 1983; Gegenfurtner &
Sperling, 1993; Sperling, 1967).
Although the pre-change representation is easily
overwritten by new visual input, it is clear from our re-
sults that not all new input is capable of doing that. The
gray screen was not enough, the white screen was not
enough, and shifts of attention did not have any inﬂu-
ence either. Given the independence from attention, it is
important to know that we found evidence that repre-
sentation contains information about more than one
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feature of the same object. This may indicate that even
feature conjunctions remain available. However, our
stimuli were not unattended. During stimulus presenta-
tion, attention was likely to be divided over the screen.
Further, there is evidence that certain feature conjunc-
tions are available very early in visual processing (Hol-
combe & Cavanagh, 2001; Theunissen, Alain, Chevalier,
& Taylor, 2001; Woods, Alain, & Ogawa, 1998).
With regard to the neural basis of the eﬀects we ob-
served, the working memory component is very likely to
involve the prefrontal cortex and infero-temporal cortex
(IT). Both areas contain cells (at least in the monkey) that
selectively increase their ﬁring rate when an item has to be
remembered during a brief interval (Baylis & Rolls, 1987;
Fuster, 1973; Goldman-Rakic, 1990; Miller, Erickson, &
Desimone, 1996; Miller, Li, & Desimone, 1993). How-
ever, activity during the interval in IT cortex is disrupted
by intervening stimuli (Baylis & Rolls, 1987; Miller et al.,
1993). This suggests that some IT cells are more involved
in iconic memory than in working memory.
It has been proposed that area IT serves two parallel
short term memory mechanisms, one automatic, non-
selective and one that selectively encodes the relevant
stimuli (Miller & Desimone, 1994), which is compatible
with our interpretation of the present results. Cells in
more posterior brain areas, like V4, V2 and V1, are not
commonly associated with memory, but recently,
memory-related activity has been found in V1. The
memory signal involved was not an enhancement of
ﬁring rate during the interval, but a continuation of
ﬁgure–background activity after stimulus disappearance
(Super, Spekreijse, & Lamme, 2001). It becomes in-
creasingly evident that many diﬀerent brain areas are
simultaneously involved in various kinds of short term
memory (Cornette, Dupont, Bormans, Mortelmans, &
Orban, 2001). Therefore, the transfer of information
from iconic to working memory should probably not be
seen as moving a representation from one brain area to
another, but rather as a local increase in connectivity
between areas.
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